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We stand nakedly in front of a very serious pandemic, as mortal as any pandemic
there ever has been," said Halfdan Mahler, director-general of the World Health
Organization (WHO). "I don't know of any greater killer than AIDS, not to speak of its
psychological, social and economic maiming. Everything is getting worse and worse with
AIDS and all of us have been underestimating it, and I in particular. We're running
scared. I cannot imagine a worse health problem in this century." When asked to compare
AIDS to other epidemics, such as smallpox, that have infected and killed over the course
of history, Mahler said he "could not think of anything else that matched the estimates that
one hundred million people will be infected with AIDS within ten years of its discovery." 1
In the years immediately before the world learned of the baffling and deadly new dis-
ease that would come to be called AIDS, there were forewarnings that something truly
ominous was stirring.
In late 1979, young New York City men, some of them in prime physical condition, had
begun to manifest vague but debilitating symptoms. The men's ailments, at first, did not
seem very worrisome. Lymph glands in their neck, groin, or under their arms became
swollen— and, curiously, stayed that way, although this common sign of infection is usu-
ally temporary. The men also intermittently had sore throats, transient fever, and brutal
night sweats. Some had a dry cough, muscle aches, shortness of breath. They complained
of being unduly tired, and many, inexplicably, lost a considerable amount of weight. They
seemed to have a strange and persistent flu that they didn't ever completely get over. They
also seemed chronically run-down and open to one infection after another. They had only
one thing in common: they were all homosexuals. And so the syndrome was gratuitously
labeled gay-related immune deficiency (GRID), or the gay disease.
Soon, some of these men, whose smouldering illness kept worsening, began to develop
different symptoms — peculiar purplish spots on their arms, legs, torso, face. Their doc-
tors had rarely, if ever, seen such blemishes — and never on young healthy men. They
appeared to have a skin cancer called Kaposi's sarcoma (KS). While the young men's KS
was virulent, the cancer typically had been a chronic affliction of elderly middle-Euro-
pean Jewish men and aged Italian men. It had been slow growing and seldom killed. Por-
tentously, an unexplained but even more aggressively malignant form ofKS had recently
Loretta McLaughlin is deputy editor ofthe editorial pages ofthe Boston Globe and is a long-time medical news
writer on AIDS.
15
New England Journal ofPublic Policy
turned up in central Africa. In the United States, KS had occasionally been seen in pa-
tients who were undergoing chemotherapy for some other form of cancer. These instances
ofKS were associated with the patients' immune system being impaired by the cancer
treatment. As a result, the KS in the New York men was thought of as an "opportunistic"
disorder— one that took advantage of a person's immune defenses being down. The
men's run-down state also was thought to account for the fungal infection (Candida, famil-
iarly called thrush) that often appeared in their mouths, and the gross cold sores (herpes
simplex) that sometimes spread across their faces. These, too, were signs that what should
have remained bland infections were opportunistically flourishing in the absence of a
sound immune system. Strangely, all of these patients also were homosexual. So, the KS
syndrome in the young New York men, whose immune systems were obviously out of
kilter, though no one knew why, was first labeled Kaposi's sarcoma and opportunistic
infections (KS/OI). Or the gay cancer.
During the same period, in California, a handful of cases of Pneumocystis carinii
showed up— a rare and exotic form of pneumonia. The organism that causes this pneu-
monia is a truly primitive agent, a protozoan, which in evolutionary terms dates back to
the first single-celled animals from which life derived. It is found everywhere in the world
and is one of countless microbes that are carried by most people. Normally, these mi-
crobes remain innocuous, in that they are kept suppressed in the human system. Yet, in
late 1979 and 1980, Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia was diagnosed in five young men in
Los Angeles. All had the same sort of pre-pneumonia syndrome of fever, malaise, cough,
and thrush which had been troubling the New York City KS cases and the GRID patients.
Studies of the California men showed that they, too, had impaired immune systems. They
all also were homosexual. Now there was "the gay pneumonia, PCP."
What first attracted the attention of the federal Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in
Atlanta, Georgia, was a flurry of requests from the Los Angeles doctors for samples of a
drug, pentamidine, that was effective against the pneumonia. The drug was needed so
rarely that the nation's entire supply was stored at the CDC.
The first public inkling of the five pneumonia cases came in the June 5, 1981 , issue of
the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR), the CDC's widely disseminated
monitor of infectious disease and deaths in the United States. Less than a month later, on
July 3, the CDC was reporting the phenomenal appearance of Kaposi's sarcoma in New
York City— twenty-six KS cases over a thirty-month period. The same July report impor-
tantly noted that six of these twenty-six persons had also developed Pneumocystis carinii;
there also were ten additional cases of the exotic pneumonia in Los Angeles and six in the
San Francisco Bay area. Two of the ten in Los Angeles also had KS, strongly suggesting a
link between the cancer and the pneumonia. All the cases still were among homosexuals.
By the end of August, there were seventy more patients with both conditions from the
same three cities.
Nearly a year passed before the early-phase condition, defined for no apparent reason
as generalized lymphadenopathy, or chronic swollen glands, was acknowledged on May
21 , 1982, by the CDC as an emerging health problem among American homosexual
males; fifty-seven cases were cited. This report noted too that the men's immune systems
were abnormal. And by June 1 1 , a second cancer, lymphoma, a rare cancer of the lymph
glands, which are key players in the immune system, was added to the roster of disorders
related somehow to the swollen gland syndrome in gay men. Sexual transmission was
raised as a possibility, as was the use of sexually stimulating "poppers" or other illicit
drugs.
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It was this year-long association of an emerging new illness with homosexual men —
and only homosexual men — that underlies the ease with which the illness that was to
become AIDS was medically and politically ignored as a major health problem. As U.S.
Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) had said earlier in April, "There is no doubt in my mind
that, if the same disease had appeared among Americans of Norwegian descent, or among
tennis players, rather than gay males, the responses of both the government and the medi-
cal community would have been different." Noting that copious attention, money, and
research had been poured into solving the mystery of a form of pneumonia that in 1976
had struck an American Legion convention in Philadelphia, Representative Waxman
concluded, "What society judged was not the severity of the disease but the social accept-
ability of the individuals affected with it." 2 Yet there were early indicators, had they been
heeded, that a medical storm was brewing which eventually would blow across the coun-
try — and the world— leaving no corner untouched.
As early as July 9, 1982, the first appearance of the new disease was noted outside the
male homosexual community. That day, the CDC reported that the same syndrome— the
Kaposi's cancer, the Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, and the severe opportunistic fungal
and viral infections — along with an old infection, tuberculosis — had appeared among
thirty-four Haitians newly residing in the United States. They, too, were mysteriously
immunocompromised. It was a startling development, which the CDC in its low-key style
referred to as a "new phenomenon." 3 Nearly all the Haitian patients were heterosexual.
The CDC report also noted that an unusual form ofKS had recently been observed in
Port-au-Prince (Haiti). Though time would reveal that the cases in the Haitians were mis-
construed — causing them cruel and unwarranted discrimination— the central point was
that the disease had appeared in heterosexual patients, so the cause of its spread was not
limited to male homosexual practices. It was an early warning of things to come.
Although the information was not substantial enough to be published, word of other
complications and of the transmission of the new disease to other groups was arriving
virtually month by month at the CDC. Addicts who used, and often shared, needles to
inject narcotics directly into the bloodstream were afflicted. So were the first handful of
the nation's twenty thousand hemophiliacs who rely on a product called Factor VIII,
extracted from pools of donated blood, to stem their inherited tendency to bleed inter-
nally. The new disorder also had been linked to a blood transfusion. A blood recipient had
become sick after receiving blood from a donor who later had become sick himself. 4 The
nation's leading blood banks, to their later regret, imprudently resisted facing up to the
danger this posed for the nation's blood supply. Babies born to mothers who were drug-
addicted or who were the sexual partners of needle-using addicts were also falling ill,
signifying that the disease could be passed during pregnancy or childbirth. The pattern of
the cases all supported the single idea that a new virus, an extraordinarily deadly virus,
was loose. The pattern also indicated that the mysterious virus could be transmitted sexu-
ally or via blood, much the same as the hepatitis B virus. Questions immediately arose as
to whether the new disease could be passed to health workers, as hepatitis can be, from
needle sticks with contaminated blood. Infectious-disease experts were relieved that there
were no signs the new disease was "contagious," like measles or flu, which spread on
airborne particles wherever people congregate. Nor did it seem to be easily "infectious,"
like mononucleosis, the high-school and college-age disease that is marked by unrelieved
fatigue and that can be spread through casual contact, through kissing, or by drinking
from the same glass or Coke bottle. Nonetheless, infectious-disease experts, early in the
AIDS outbreak, were privately frightened about the prospects for sexual and blood-borne
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spread. Some of the infections these patients were developing were horrendous — some
almost never seen before, except in animals. Further, in some patients, the disease seemed
to directly attack the brain. Doctors and nurses were struck by the intensity of the pa-
tients' illness; these were among the sickest patients ever seen in a lifetime of providing
medical care.
Terribly worrisome would be the prolonged incubation period — now known to extend
from two to ten years — when an infected person could look and feel well while harboring
the virus and could unwittingly pass it to others. This lengthy symptom-free but infectious
stage, a long period of silent transmission, is incredibly dangerous. Without knowing it,
the CDC by mid- 1982 had already learned the disease's primary target groups and the
most salient of its broad clinical ramifications. The final characteristic of the disease was
its deadliness: it seemed to eventually kill without exception.
The era of AIDS had dawned. The syndrome was first defined and given its name in the
CDC's September 3, 1982, weekly morbidity and mortality report: "This group of clini-
cal entities, along with its specific immune deficiency, is now called acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS)." 5 By that time, there were 593 confirmed cases in the
United States, and 243 were already dead. As of February 1988, nearly seven years into
the epidemic, yet probably still nearer the beginning than the end, the worst fears of those
early days had been realized. Nearly 55,000 cases ofAIDS had been logged, and 30,000
had died of AIDS in the United States. A broader definition ofAIDS now includes
twenty-four infections and ten cancers. The definition also now covers the sickest of those
patients with a chronic progressive form of AIDS called ARC (AIDS-related complex)
and three other conditions when they develop in people infected with the AIDS virus:
dementia, tuberculosis, and a profound, irreversible, eventually fatal weight loss called
"wasting" syndrome. 6
A great deal of scientific progress has been made — more learned, more rapidly than
ever before about a single virus. But few doubt that more could have been done had more
research funds become available sooner. Too little has yet been done in any coherent or
comprehensive way through public education to limit the spread of the disease; to prepare
the public for the onslaught of cases that are already in the pipeline; or to rally funds,
prepare facilities, or organize the means to deliver medical care to the tens of thousands in
the United States and the millions across the world who will need AIDS care in the imme-
diate years ahead.
On the plus side, the cause of AIDS is now known, officially designated human im-
munodeficiency virus (HIV) . A more cunning virus is hard to imagine. It has more ge-
netic material with which to constantly redesign its surface than any other known. It can
and does change somewhat, individuate, in virtually each person infected. When acti-
vated, it can replicate by making copies of itself many times faster than any other known
virus. And, like a fifth column agent, it attacks the very cells in the human system which
call forth and orchestrate the defenses that each person relies on to protect against disease.
Discovery of the virus in 1983 by a French team at the Pasteur Institute in Paris — an
achievement later duplicated by an American team at the National Cancer Institute— led
fairly quickly to development of a test. An indirect test, in that it detects antibody re-
sponse to the virus rather than the virus itself, was officially released on March 2, 1985.
Henceforth, blood could be protected. Though it was loudly argued that the test did not
specifically indicate a person was carrying the virus, the finding that a person once in-
fected apparently remains so forever signifies that a positive AIDS antibody test actually
does diagnose infection. Thus, those who are infected can be identified. Search for treat-
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ment already has elucidated one medicine (AZT) that can at least prolong life for AIDS
victims, though it is highly toxic. Dozens of other drugs or treatment approaches are
under study. A cure still seems remote, considering the virus's capacity to make itself part
of the genetic material of its human host and to take sanctuary in the brain, where most
drugs do not reach, or not at full strength. A vaccine is being sought, but the capacity of
the virus to change and in other ways to outwit the immune response upon which vaccine
protection is predicated diminishes the likelihood that an effective vaccine will soon be
available.
From all indications, AIDS will be with us for a long time to come. 'AIDS is out of the
box," says Dr. James Chin of California, a World Health Organization consultant whose
primary work is maintaining global surveillance of the disease. "Even if we had an effec-
tive vaccine to protect new cases today, it is something the world would have to live with
over the next century." Before it is conquered, AIDS has the potential to disrupt the social
and political equanimity of the United States and to wreak havoc on less fortunate parts of
the world.
AIDS is seen as a slow plague, one that will probably take a generation to unfold. The
United States' capacity to bear this new health burden, though it will be strained, is light-
years ahead of that of Third World countries, where the annual outlay for health care
amounts to a few scant dollars per person, or less. Yet it is in Third World nations, most
notably so far in Africa, the Philippines, the Caribbean, and Central and South America,
that the AIDS epidemic is spreading rapidly. These are areas already beset by other dire
health, economic, and social problems — from malaria, tuberculosis, and parasitic disor-
ders to malnutrition and poverty, illiteracy and industrial backwardness, rampant popula-
tion growth and financial dependency.
With the very first case, AIDS was an epidemic. In modern epidemiology terms, that
designation applies to any unusual outbreak of a disease, even one more case than should
be expected. Because the disease never existed before, AIDS, then, was automatically an
epidemic. Though the subject is in dispute, some think that the disease originated in Af-
rica. A virus that is highly similar to the human AIDS virus is found in green monkeys in
Africa, though it does not make the monkeys sick. And the first evidence ofAIDS —
identified much later— were traces of the virus which were coaxed out of human blood
samples (stored and frozen for research purposes) collected in Kinshasa, Zaire, in 1959.
Though co-exposure to malaria confused the AIDS status of some early blood samples,
sporadic cases of what are now known to be AIDS-related diseases clearly date back to the
mid-1970s in central and east Africa. Among the earliest victims was a Danish woman
surgeon working in Zaire, whose first signs of illness, as was later reported in the British
medical journal Lancet, began as early as 1973. 7 (A 1969 case is under study in the United
States.)
Though it is unproven and probably unprovable where and when the AIDS virus first
mutated and infected humans, there is more than theoretical reason for wishing it could be
known. IfAIDS began in Africa, then it is reasonable to look at the African experience
with AIDS as providing some timetable of the epidemic, despite many differences in our
experience with the disease.
Currently, the World Health Organization estimates that about fifty thousand cases of
AIDS have occurred in Africa, though the official number is only about one-eighth that
high. More telling, as a measure of the scope and spread of the disease on that continent,
are the crude gauges of the number of Africans who are infected with the AIDS virus.
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WHO roughly estimates that more than 3 million Africans may be infected with the AIDS
virus — as 10 million people may be worldwide— though the actual numbers could be
twice as high. The hardest hit countries are still concentrated in central and east Africa,
even though AIDS has now spread throughout the continent. Further, a second AIDS
virus, HIV-2, has been found extensively in west Africa; a third, labeled SBL 6669 V-2,
was identified in west Africans being treated in Sweden; and a fourth virus that causes
AIDS-like disease has been isolated from Nigerian cases. African and World Health Or-
ganization specialists, along with European and American medical teams, have carried
out blood samplings in capital cities among prostitutes, blood donors, adult and pediatric
patients, pregnant women, and health workers at large public hospitals and clinics in
many central and east African nations. Updated surveys indicate that up to 20 percent of
men and women in the twenty- to forty-year-old age group and 10 percent of hospitalized
children in some urban areas are already infected with the AIDS virus. 8 At some large
maternity clinics, 20 to 25 percent of pregnant mothers are infected and infant mortality
from AIDS alone is high. The findings are difficult to assess, because it is unknown
whether those who are using hospitals are sicker or just better informed; thus the groups
studied may be selectively high for AIDS. In various cities, however, 1 to 18 percent of the
blood donors are positive for AIDS. 9 Other studies indicate that hospital workers are in-
fected at about the same rate as the patients, not from taking care of them but from the
same cause as the patients. Infection rates among African female prostitutes range from
27 to 88 percent. 10 Every new sampling shows higher figures, a rate ofAIDS infectivity
that is still rising at about 1 percent a year. Hard-won gains against a multitude of health
problems in Africa threaten to be undone by AIDS. "Millions of deaths occur every year
in the Third World because of diseases that could be prevented by vaccines," says WHO
director-general Mahler. "Now AIDS comes along and there is the risk it will overshadow
all the other diseases." 11
AIDS is different in terms of symptoms and patterns of spread in Africa than in the
United States, which may partially account for why it went unrecognized there so long.
One form the disease takes in Africa was labeled "slim disease" — an irreversible wasting
away. These AIDS patients look as if they are starving to death for lack of food, and some
were confused with those who truly had. Other African AIDS cases, as elsewhere, mani-
fest the viral, fungal, and bacterial infections that their previously healthy immune sys-
tems had held in check. AIDS also allows latent tuberculosis to reestablish itself. Recent
samplings found that 40 percent of patients in TB sanitaria were infected with AIDS. 12 In
countries where underlying TB infection is widespread, the arrival of a disease that can
activate TB has a ripple effect. AIDS is such a disease, and while it is not spread casually,
TB is, raising the specter of renewed infection with TB among coworkers, family mem-
bers, community contacts, and health care teams. Further, with AIDS, many patients have
severe reactions to anti-TB drugs. Exotic fungal infections that are naturally more preva-
lent in equatorial countries add to the AIDS burden in such climates. A Massachusetts
Institute of Technology study suggests that the speed at which a person infected with the
AIDS virus converts from silent to overt disease is governed by the frequency of other
infections. If this is so, then Third World people whose lives are peppered with the dis-
eases that thrive in heat, humidity, and squalor are in terrible jeopardy.
In Africa and elsewhere in the Third World, AIDS is indisputably a heterosexual dis-
ease, spread primarily through ordinary sexual intercourse, as well as in pregnancy from
mother to child, and by breast feeding. As Halfdan Mahler points out, these modes of
transmission "touch on the most intimate contacts of family life." 13 Thus, interrupting the
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spread ofAIDS in the Third World will be exceedingly difficult. The incidence of stan-
dard sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) also is very high, and these infections often are
inadequately treated (there and here), leaving multitudes of STD victims prone to second-
ary infection with AIDS. Lack of disposable hypodermic needles and syringes contributes
to the spread of AIDS in the Third World. Needles are scarce and must be reused; often,
they are inadequately sterilized, even though household bleach readily kills the AIDS
virus. In some STD clinics, it is common practice for a large syringe to be filled with
multiple doses of antibiotics. When the same syringe needle is used to inject a row of
patients, if one patient is infected with AIDS, the infection may be passed to the rest— as
with needle-using drug addicts in U.S. cities. Pressure-gun injections are also now sus-
pected of being able to spread AIDS. Blood transfusions remain a serious source of AIDS
transmission. Testing blood for AIDS currently costs $5 to $10, an impossible expense.
New, simple, and inexpensive blood tests will soon be available, but they are less sensi-
tive. Moreover, with the discovery of additional AIDS-causing viruses, tests will have to
detect all of them. With limited electric power, there is little opportunity to freeze and
store blood. In most of the world, blood drawn in the morning is often transfused before
nightfall — "so urgently needed," says one CDC physician, "it is often still warm." 14
Demand for blood is high in Africa and wherever children are prone to sickle-cell ane-
mia, malaria, and parasitic diseases that thin the blood.
The heterosexual spread ofAIDS has many catch-22 characteristics in Africa and other
Third World countries. High-risk groups, outside of prostitutes and long-distance truck
drivers, are not easy targets of prevention campaigns. In many of these countries, polyg-
amy is legal as well as religiously and culturally sanctioned. A polygamous husband with
AIDS risks transmitting it to more than one wife: the availability as well as the acceptance
of contraception is limited; condoms are the least favored means. In Africa, the average
woman bears more than six children. If she is infected, her progeny are likely to be in-
fected during pregnancy or childbirth. Outside the First World, breast feeding is predomi-
nant; infected mothers can transmit the AIDS virus in breast milk. Immunization with live
virus vaccines, such as for polio, measles, and mumps, carries new risks. Given to AIDS-
infected children who inefficiently make antibody, the virus-laced vaccines may give
them the actual disease; immunizing other children who may shed live virus from the
vaccine may also expose an AIDS-infected child in the family to the infection. Choices
with a high social cost lie ahead: cutting back treatment for STDs versus paying for higher
priced sterilization procedures; limiting breast feeding versus providing needed nutrition;
curtailing immunization versus controlling childhood diseases; restricting blood transfu-
sion versus maintaining life support.
While there was nothing that African nations could have done in the absence of knowl-
edge about AIDS to protect their already hard-pressed people, heroic efforts are now
under way. Almost every African nation has appointed an AIDS advisory commission,
and education campaigns are gearing up. Yet, on top of intrinsic social problems, many
African nations are caught up, directly or indirectly, in political, military, and economic
upheaval that involves great movements of troops, workers, displaced families, and refu-
gees. Vast numbers of tradesmen, truckers, food suppliers, and camp followers crisscross
the continent, moving back and forth from city to village to encampments. There also is
constant relocation of workers from the countryside along the roads and railroad tracks
into cities and a consequent mushrooming of slums and informal households. The AIDS
virus now travels with all of it.
There is great anxiety that some African countries may lose a key segment of their
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young adults, along with part of the next generation of children. In one capital city, the
rate of infection is about 30 percent among the educated young men — the group that
carries out much of the city's daily business and commerce. Professor Charles Myers of
the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) estimates that by 1995, AIDS
will have killed so many productive young adults in Zaire that the nation's gross national
product may drop by 8 percent — the equivalent of a $292 billion loss in GNP for the
United States. "The mind boggles at the numbers," Myers said of his projections of the
impact of AIDS on many central African countries. "On economic grounds alone, the
case for very high levels of preventive expenditures — even if success is limited — is ex-
tremely strong." !5 Currently, the World Health Organization estimates that it will need
$1.2 billion in extra funds to combat AIDS in countries that do not have enough to do it
themselves. Yet, the United States is not fulfilling its share of the bargain, despite long-
established policy in support ofWHO. Dr. William Foege. former head of the CDC, notes
that the United States spends on its own health care "in seventy minutes of one day" the
$61 million that was assessed as its share of the 1986 WHO budget. Only $10 million has
been paid, "while the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and the Western European countries
have all paid in full. I am personally embarrassed that our government has weakened the
chances of solving the world AIDS problem," Foege says. 16 It will prove to be extremely
costly economizing in the long run.
I have devoted considerable attention to AIDS in Africa because more is known about
what is happening there. But the AIDS factors and forces at work in Africa apply widely
across the Third World. Brazil now ranks second to the United States in incidence of
AIDS among single countries in the Western Hemisphere. Though the official number of
cases there is two thousand, the actual number is probably ten times greater. The Brazil-
ian government says it is testing donated blood in public hospitals, but some 90 percent of
blood for transfusion is collected and sold by private companies, which have not been
testing at all, according to U.S. AIDS experts who recently visited there. " Other factors
in Brazil which are singularly relevant to AIDS spread are the nation's week-long, sexu-
ally wanton, pre-Lenten Carnivale; religious bans on condom use in an overwhelmingly
Catholic nation; surveys that point to a bisexual spread of AIDS ten times greater than in
Western Europe; and a well documented, culturally accepted practice of anal intercourse
by heterosexuals. 18
Though Haiti's tally of cases is unofficially set at about fifteen hundred, Haiti's case
rate is estimated to be higher, about thirty per one hundred thousand— twice that of the
United States as a whole. As here, cases are congregated in cities. Dr. Jean Pape, a Hai-
tian physician who is a member of the Cornell University Medical School faculty, has
been researching AIDS in Port-au-Prince since 1982. His research suggests that 10 per-
cent of the adults in urban areas, 66 percent of the city prostitutes (many from the
neighboring Dominican Republic), and 3 percent of Haitians in rural areas are infected
with the AIDS virus. In a culture where folk medicine predominates, AIDS may also
be spread through ritualistic cutting and "injection" of innocuous substances on dirty
needles. In the most impoverished nation in the hemisphere, haunted by starvation and
now caught up in political turmoil, the prospects for controlling AIDS are dim.
No Central or South American country is without AIDS, nor any island of the Carib-
bean. And not the Latin American country of Mexico, which appears on its way toward a
significant AIDS problem. The effects of sporadic AIDS-prevention campaign blitzes are
not long lasting. In many of the countries, strong anti-American protests are being
voiced. Many see the United States as the source of their AIDS problem— as is also felt
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in Europe — believing the disease is spread not only by the U.S. members of the interna-
tional jet set— American gay males and heterosexual swingers — but also by AIDS-con-
taminated blood and blood products from the United States.
Informal reports from Cuba indicate that AIDS-infected military personnel returning
from Angola are being "held" at one end of the island, where they may be joined by fam-
ily members if they so wish. Two Cuban hospitals have established AIDS wards, and the
Cuban government has established a new AIDS prevention and control program, accord-
ing to Radio Marti, which operates under the direction of the U.S. Information Agency.
In the Philippines, outbreaks of AIDS have centered in bars and brothels frequented by
U.S. servicemen. Beyond trying to cope with their own incipient AIDS problem or to
ward off its taking root— especially in Asian countries, where AIDS has appeared later
and only minimally — some countries are taking drastic steps to identify and ship home
any foreigners found to be harboring the AIDS virus. In China, Japan, and India (as well
as the Soviet Union, several Soviet Union bloc nations, Belgium, and Germany), all for-
eign students already are required to take AIDS blood tests. If the tests are positive, the
students' scholarships are revoked and the students are sent home. Since many foreign
students in these countries are Africans, concern is growing that AIDS is being used as a
new foil for racism. Thailand and Iraq mandate that all visitors — and natives returning
from abroad— be AIDS-tested. Belgium is considering the same for visitors from Afri-
can countries. China is weighing a law that would require any foreign visitor who planned
to stay for six months to undergo medical examinations for AIDS.
Similarly, the United States has now made an AIDS test a prerequisite for the 530,000
to 600,000 immigrants seeking permanent residence each year in this country. There is
bitter irony in the newly ordered AIDS testing of the estimated 2 million to 4 million ille-
gal aliens who may hope to remain in the United States under the revised resident alien
law. If they have been residents here since before 1982 — which the law now requires
them to prove— the great probability is that they became infected here. If sent back to
their native countries, they will take AIDS — and the potential for spreading it— with
them. In San Salvador, health officials are alarmed that hundreds of thousands of Salva-
dorans now living in the United States will be deported and will bring an AIDS epidemic
home with them. All seven cases ofAIDS which had been registered in El Salvador by
May 12, 1987, were in Salvadorans who contracted AIDS in the United States and "came
back to their country to die," says Dr. Lidia de Nieto, a member of the nation's Health
Ministry. 19 While great attention was paid to the U.S. decision to test all recruits for mili-
tary service as well as all members of the armed forces, almost none was given to U.S.
State Department testing that began on January 1, 1987, of all Foreign Service personnel
and their dependents, including thousands of members of the Peace Corps and the U.S.
Agency for International Development. The Foreign Service chapter of the American
Federation of Government Employees has filed suit to protest such "routine" testing;
court documents revealed that seventeen Americans in the Foreign Service had already
contracted AIDS and that five of them had died. AIDS thus has become a new job hazard
for Americans working overseas, particularly where there is risk of being injured, requir-
ing transfusions, and getting the AIDS virus from contaminated blood. The future signifi-
cance ofAIDS as a deterrent, not only to government foreign service, including the Peace
Corps, but to the army of missionary workers across the world, is scarcely recognized.
Nor has the portent of the disease been evaluated in terms of international trade and world
economics, political, and even military operations. Kenya has requested that U.S. naval
ships no longer allow their crews to disembark at Mombasa; the Philippines have linked
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their AIDS problem to bar girls working near the U.S. naval base at Subic Bay or Clark
Air Base north of Manila, the largest installations used by U.S. forces outside the United
States. Very slowly but surely, AIDS is moving into these larger contexts. This past
March, an international conference (at the Barbican Center, London, organized by the
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine) on the global impact of AIDS met to
assess the social, economic, and political AIDS issues, including travel restrictions, em-
ployment problems, population dynamics, and volunteer work.
Nowhere has AIDS become so much a part of daily life as in Europe, where the pattern
of the outbreak most closely resembles the U.S. pattern. Though they have far fewer cases
(eight thousand cases in twenty-seven countries) than the United States, European coun-
tries moved quickly into public education campaigns. Direct mailings have gone out to a
vast number of households; anti-AIDS messages emblazon subway walls, billboards,
taxicabs, and buses; radio, TV, and newspapers carry public service announcements.
Near U.S. military bases, AIDS is still commonly referred to as the "Yankee" disease.
Yet, despite early efforts, there are indications from Europe that the education campaigns
are gaining only limited response in changing personal sexual behavior.
The story of AIDS is far different in the United States, one of its most tragic characteris-
tics being the needless loss of time in the beginning. Many forces, blindly or deliberately,
converged to permit the AIDS virus to take a deep hold in this country before any mean-
ingful steps were taken to combat it. Since time is the great enemy in the fight against
AIDS, this important, early advantage was lost.
The central failure concerning AIDS is that it was not— and still is not in some quar-
ters — perceived as what it fundamentally is: a disease with potential for destruction of
great magnitude, not a form of supernatural retribution. The overriding focus of early
social and political attention was its male homosexual spread— too often on judgmental,
moralistic terms.
AIDS origin here, primarily among homosexual men, made the disease not only dis-
tasteful but dismissable to many, most notably the Reagan White House, which has been
unduly influenced by ultraconservative fundamentalists. Representative Waxman is on
solid ground when he says, "I am convinced that had the first victims ofAIDS been mem-
bers of the Chamber of Commerce, the Reagan Administration would have responded
immediately and forthrightly. Because the male homosexual population was first affected
by AIDS, the Reagan Administration thought of this group as dispensable and didn't re-
spond as quickly as it could have and should have. The Administration has handled this
whole thing in an irresponsible way. As a matter of fact, I think that when people look
back historically at the Reagan Administration, aside from the huge deficit that we have
run up over the last six years, the other comment on this Administration will be its failure
to deal with the AIDS crisis, which unfortunately will have gotten out of hand and af-
fected maybe millions of people." 20 To the credit of the gay male community, it organized
much needed, early support services and was the first to generate self-help, safer sex
materials. But the homosexual stigma that was attached to AIDS was the factor, above all
others, that fostered political and social neglect, while encouraging the expression of
pseudo-religio-political prejudice and vindictiveness. The "gay" label also permitted a
paucity of funding and a transference of attention to nonmedical economic and social
issues — mandatory blood testing, insurance screening, job discrimination, health benefit
eligibility, entitlement to Social Security Disability coverage. Though these issues are
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significant, the effect was diversionary — a begging of the question: What should the
United States be doing to combat the greatest threat to public health in modern times?
None of the major public policy issues surrounding AIDS has yet been resolved.
Essentially these issues can be broadly summarized under three headings: mobilizing to
fight the disease, through funding and organizing research and medical care; civil rights,
in the sense of safeguards against discrimination within the conflict between public and
private rights; and prevention, through education and public health programs.
Mobilizing to Fight the Disease
When the proposed $790 million AIDS budget for FY' 88, which covers research, epide-
miology, public health services, and information programs, is included, the federal gov-
ernment will have spent or allocated $1 .676 billion for AIDS since mid- 198 1 . (On
February 18, details of the FY' 89 federal budget indicated an administration request for
$1.7 billion for all AIDS-related federal programs, including the U.S. Public Health Serv-
ice [PHS], Medicare and Medicaid, the Department of Defense, and the federal Bureau of
Prisons.) The glaring flaw in that funding picture is that the sum did not even amount to
$100 million prior to FY'85 — four years into the epidemic. It also should be noted that
in each fiscal year since 1983, it has fallen to the Congress to increase the AIDS budget
by 76 to 115 percent over the previous year, markedly exceeding the administration's
request. 21
Nearly $485 million in additional monies is budgeted for 1988 to underwrite the federal
share of Medicaid, Medicare, Social Security, and Veterans Administration costs for the
care and support ofAIDS patients, and for massive, mandatory AIDS-testing programs
for recruits and members of the armed forces, Job Corps enrollees, Foreign Service em-
ployees, and federal prisoners.
Through the end of 1987, individual states had allocated an additional $200 million,
primarily for support services and education, though some funds for research were speci-
fied. Five states alone (California, New York, Florida, New Jersey, and Massachusetts)
accounted for 85 percent of this money. 22
Insofar as AIDS research is concerned, a number of problems stem from the lack of
clear policy. Until 1988, funding was woefully inadequate. Even next year, federal funds
for research will approximate only half a billion dollars — the remaining $250 million is
earmarked for education and prevention. Whatever excuses may be offered for early fail-
ure to recognize the need to fully fund AIDS research, none remain. In October 1986, the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the Institute of Medicine (IOM) concluded in
their joint study on AIDS that funding for AIDS research should be set at a billion dollars
a year by 1990— two years hence— and, further, that another billion dollars should be
spent for public education and prevention, through a combination of federal, state, and
private funds. Moreover, NAS-IOM underscored the need for such funds to be new
funds — not siphoned from existing Public Health funds, as has chronically been the case
in previous years. 23
A second research problem, in the view of some scientists, has been the lack of a com-
prehensive, coherent approach to AIDS research. While it is agreed that new knowledge
is needed to understand the AIDS virus and its biologic activity in humans — knowledge
that can come only from basic research— it is nonetheless arguable that the components
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of that research can be far better focused and integrated. The National Institutes of Health
(NIH) could and should better coordinate in-house and externally assigned work and
industrial projects. Much more could be done to bring together the groups involved in
these projects. NIH is still authorizing research without first consulting the teams most
likely to do the work. While NIH has identified the major lines of research — vaccines,
anti-AIDS drugs, and virus investigations — it has not fully asked the research community
what it sees as the best approach, the best targets, or the best way to organize. Among
those scientists who subscribe to the view that greater coordination is both possible and
necessary is Dr. David Baltimore, a Nobelist in medicine and physiology who received
the prize for his work in virology, and director of the Whitehead Institute at the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology.
One research area that has become better coordinated is the testing of new anti-AIDS
drugs under the aegis of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. Such
evaluations are now under way at nineteen centers across the country. While much has
been done and fresh efforts are being made to enlist the nation's front-line scientists in the
research drive to unravel the mystery of AIDS, the public policy issues ofhow large the
federal commitment to AIDS research should be, how fast it can be deployed, and how
that research will be organized — perhaps even targeted— are yet to be fully aired or
addressed.
Of at least equal importance is the public policy issue of assuring all AIDS patients
medical care, and how that care is to be funded. Estimates of the direct medical care costs
of AIDS vary widely. The best guess most widely cited is $8.5 billion to $16 billion a year
by 1991 , calculated for the Centers for Disease Control by economist Anne Scitovsky of
the Palo Alto Medical Foundation/Research Institute and her colleague Dorothy Rice of
the University of California at San Francisco. 24 Their projections, however, are based on
1985 and 1986 data and on a U.S. Public Health Service forecast that estimates the United
States will experience 270,000 cases of AIDS by 199 1 . Dr. Stephen Joseph, New York
City health commissioner, has stressed that in 1991 alone, there will be more new AIDS
cases than cumulatively in all the years from 1980 to the present. These projections do not
reflect the unexpectedly large explosion of AIDS infectivity in needle-using drug addicts
(or any significant spread of AIDS into the heterosexual population), which makes the
upper estimate of $16 billion by 1991 more likely. Further, a forecast by the Rand Corpo-
ration, a California think tank, considers the PHS projection (of 270,000 cases between
1981 and 1991) low and offers a mid-to-high-range estimate of 400,000 to 750,000 cumu-
lative cases in that period. 25 Rand says its mid-range estimate would boost medical costs
for AIDS to $38 billion by 1991
.
For comparative purposes, even the low estimate of $8.5 billion a year for AIDS in
1991 rivals or exceeds the medical costs associated with other major health care expendi-
tures: by 1991, $8 billion for caring for auto accident victims; $4.9 billion for digestive
cancers; and $3.9 billion for lung cancer. 26
While $8.5 billion to $16 billion in AIDS medical costs adds only a small percentage
increase to the national health care expenditure, it should be kept in mind that AIDS is a
completely new cost burden. Further, most AIDS patients are young adults, who histori-
cally are in an age group with the lowest medical expenses. Moreover, the costs will not
be evenly distributed, any more than the patient load will be. Though U.S. AIDS cases
have been concentrated in five major cities (Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York,
Houston, and Miami), the CDC predicts that 80 percent of the growth by 1991 will occur
outside these areas. Nonetheless, the heaviest case loads will continue in cities, and a
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disproportionate number of cases will increasingly be among minorities, who dominate
the populations of inner-city, urban poor.
Some 50 million Americans have inadequate health care coverage, and 30 million under
the age of sixty-five have none. 27 The federal Health Care Financing Administration esti-
mates that 40 percent ofAIDS patients' care is currently being paid under federal/state
Medicaid programs, though in some inner-city areas the figure rises to nearly 80 percent.
To be eligible for Medicaid, of course, AIDS patients must first be impoverished.
The availability of Medicare for AIDS patients, under Social Security Disability cover-
age, is relatively meaningless. Disabled AIDS patients must "qualify" first by having
made payroll contributions; then, they must prove that they are unable to work for a con-
tinuous period of at least twelve months. Though the eligibility period for receiving cash
benefits has been shortened, patients must wait an additional twenty-four months for
Medicare benefits. 28 Only 1 to 3 percent of AIDS patients live long enough to qualify for
Medicare, though this could change if new therapies prolong survival.
In view of these medical-cost calculations, the AIDS epidemic requires new public
policy on how the costs are to be met. Private insurance pools have been recommended, as
have other publicly financed reimbursement strategies. But it is clear that only the federal
system can deal with the huge expenditures that AIDS care will entail, and that only fed-
eral policy can set the course. The health care system in the United States is disjointed and
uneven, owing to the disparate mechanisms under which it is funded, and many health
care delivery planners believe that it cannot withstand the financial burden that will be
imposed upon it by AIDS. Many of these planners feel that only a national health insur-
ance program, drawing on the widest base possible, will be able to aggregate and dispense
sufficient funds in timely enough fashion to meet the challenge of AIDS.
Almost all studies so far have limited their consideration to overt AIDS, according to
the old CDC definition. The broader definition put into effect in September 1987, which
includes seriously ill ARC patients and other AIDS-related conditions, is expected to raise
all estimates by at least 15 percent. 29 Further, new analyses of New York City's experience
find that 46 percent of patients hospitalized with AIDS infections are chronic ARC pa-
tients, many ofwhom become sick and die without ever having met official AIDS defini-
tions. The CDC itself has said that its AIDS figures may be underreported by 40 percent.
Whatever the actual case loads ultimately prove to be, they are much more likely to be
higher, not lower, than current analyses indicate.
Money is not the only AIDS medical care problem. Shortages of nurses and of appro-
priate facilities, such as hospices for dying AIDS patients and inpatient services for those
with dementia, further complicate the picture. Studies indicate that AIDS patients require
at least 40 percent more nursing care than other medical/surgical or pediatric patients.
This translates into eight or more hours of direct nursing care per day. At these high levels
of care, it is estimated that at least thirteen thousand additional nurses will be needed for
AIDS patients alone by 1991 , at a time when nurses will still be critically scarce. The
nursing requirements also preclude the possibility that many AIDS patients will be able to
be cared for in nursing homes, since the patients need far more nursing care than is avail-
able in a skilled nursing facility. Studies have further shown that AIDS patients, because
of physical and mental disabilities, also place high demands on social services. While
models for flexible, alternative approaches to AIDS care (most notably developed in San
Francisco), such as residences, hospices, and home care, should be pursued, they are not
readily available. Shortages in home care staff and in funding for home care already are
tying up services for the elderly. A new (October 1987) Massachusetts Hospital Associa-
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tion study identified the "most pressing" gaps in the health delivery system as the unavail-
ability of secure inpatient psychiatric services for AIDS patients suffering neurological
and other mental disturbances; an inadequate number of drug abuse programs, particu-
larly methadone treatment centers; and a shortage of home health and hospice services,
which already "appear seriously strained." 30
What is certain is that there will be no quick fix for the medical care requirements of
AIDS patients. The hardest hit states already are reaching the limits of their financial
ability to cope with the disease. States may be a "laboratory" for devising better medical
delivery responses, but AIDS is a national health crisis and the major responsibility for
funding and for gearing up the health delivery system to respond lies with the federal
government. Such action is fraught with difficulty. Yet, public policy decisions on AIDS
medical care issues cannot be avoided much longer.
Civil Rights
At the heart of public policy considerations concerning AIDS is the conflict between
individual rights and the need to protect the public health. The AIDS outbreak here began
and persists in three groups — homosexual men, drug addicts, and prostitutes — who,
regrettably, are classic targets of discrimination and neglect.
Though pockets of public hysteria over AIDS have calmed down as confidence grows
that the disease is not casually transmitted, it should be remembered that there were spo-
radic early and continuing calls from some political-fundamentalist groups for quaran-
tine, including the recommendation that Boston Harbor's Peddocks Island, the former
home of a now-abandoned leprosy sanatorium, be used as the site. The 1986 political
campaign waged by Lyndon LaRouche in California embodied similar ugly proposals.
Artificial importance has been given the topic of mandatory blood tests for AIDS, as if
by identifying all AIDS virus carriers, some easy solution for dealing with the epidemic
would emerge. Copious energy has been devoted to the issue of AIDS testing, hardening
the lines between advocates and opponents. As Adlai Stevenson said of nuclear weaponry,
"There is no evil in the atom," only in what society does with it. 31 So it is with AIDS test-
ing: the problem lies in the use made of it. No problem would exist at all were it not for
the stigma that some have assigned to AIDS. In despicable judgments, AIDS is dismissed
as a disease of the sexually perverted, depraved junkies, and pariah prostitutes who de-
serve what they get. Though more subtly expressed, stigma still misshapes much of socie-
ty's — and the government's — response to AIDS.
The second social force feeding reaction to AIDS is fear. AIDS patients have been
evicted from apartments and fired from their jobs; a few have even been ousted from
hospitals. Even when the AIDS victims have been children, surely unwitting victims of
the disease, fear has turned otherwise reasonable adults into brute-faced protestors, refus-
ing to allow AIDS children to attend school, shunning them and their parents, and even
acting out violently against them. Despite the protection afforded by standard precaution-
ary measures, some doctors, dentists, and nurses have refused to care for AIDS patients,
and some undertakers have refused to bury them.
Fear and the prejudice born of fear are one thing. Toleration of discrimination against
AIDS patients and carriers is another. Education can minimize fear and defuse prejudice,
but law and the enforcement of law are needed to prevent future AIDS discrimination.
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Such legal protection falls within the realm of public policy. While some states have spe-
cifically outlawed AIDS discrimination, here, too, there is need for a national stance. U.S.
Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Rep. Henry Waxman are cosponsoring federal
legislation to ban discrimination against people with AIDS, to guarantee confidentiality of
AIDS-related records, and to assure privacy. Their bill was filed on June 23, 1987, in the
aftermath of the Third International Conference on AIDS, during which police in Wash-
ington, D.C. , donned heavy, yellow rubber gloves in a fear-mongering reaction to a march
by AIDS victims. Though two hearings have been held on the bill, no action is expected
until later this year. Some of the delay stems from a persistent, negative undercurrent
about AIDS, abetted by the Reagan administration's political position that such legal
protection is a state matter. Until destigmatizing legal protection is in place, progress on
the whole roster of civil rights issues concerning AIDS will be stalled. These reach into
the rights of homosexuals to fair and impartial treatment; of drug addicts and prostitutes
to life-saving preventive and curative services; of prisoners whose AIDS infectivity can
diminish their prospects for release; of military personnel whose careers may be thwarted
because of their AIDS status; of public and private employees to job equity; of children to
attend school; and of all people with AIDS to obtain housing, social services, and ade-
quate and compassionate medical care.
Alongside these rights stand the conflicting issues of whether those in sexual contact
with AIDS carriers are entitled to know they have been placed at risk; whether insurance
companies should be allowed to test applicants; the limits under which public health offi-
cials can detain AIDS carriers who deliberately continue behavior that can transmit the
infection to others; and how workers in direct care or contact with AIDS patients and
AIDS carriers are to protect themselves from infection.
These are formidable public policy issues, ones that are "unlikely soon to be met," says
Dr. Harvey Fineberg, dean of the Harvard School of Public Health. As a guideline, he
urges that the least restrictive means be sought to protect the community and that a graded
series of responses be devised before public policy steps are taken "that run the risk of
infringing upon the rights of individuals." 32 A national agenda of AIDS-related civil rights
issues needs to be set.
Prevention
Of all the sorry aspects of the AIDS epidemic in the United States, none is sorrier than the
slow and inept efforts of the federal government to prevent the spread of the infection.
While it is impossible to calculate how many people acquired the infection because they
did not know how not to — or, more to the point, had not been told in persuasive ways how
to avoid doing so — the number has to be very large, and it is still growing.
The nub of the problem, of course, is that to educate the public about safer sex as a
modality for preventing AIDS entails informing people about sexual matters. Sex educa-
tion is a topic that the U.S. government historically, and this administration particularly,
has shrunk from, as if the subject itself were a carnal sin. Beneath the torrents of hypocrit-
ical preaching about the need to be sensitive to religious teachings, family values, and
traditional morals, the basis for much of the resistance has been the viewpoint that those
who violate the bounds of chastity and fidelity should pay for their transgressions. On
such terms, AIDS can be dismissed as a form of moralistic retribution, visited upon the
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willful or, at least, the weak. However desirable strong moral codes may be for the con-
duct of society, they are weak weapons for combating a disease like AIDS, especially in an
era marked by sexually frank commercialism and increasingly open sexual behavior.
Arguments against telling people how to prevent AIDS through the use of condoms rest
on the same questionable point that has precluded telling teenagers about responsible
(pregnancy-avoiding) sexual behavior: the fear that it would encourage the very behavior
that was not wanted — promiscuity — even though extensive pilot programs prove other-
wise. The barriers to educating the American public about AIDS are nowhere clearer than
in the brouhaha that erupted in 1986 when television networks were confronted by public
service announcements that used the word condom. Condoms are more openly spoken of
now, though still more frequently on news broadcasts than in public service ads.
It was Rock Hudson's death that drove the message home as nothing else had. But until
1986, the source of AIDS preventive education remained almost exclusively the gay male
community. AIDS action committees and other similar forums assembled and distributed
the first and only booklets, posters, and fliers that advised people how to continue to
engage in sexual activities — more safely. Since these messages were directed to homo-
sexual men, they were not generally regarded as appropriate for heterosexuals, though
safer sex practices apply universally. Heterosexuals went on blindly unconcerned for a
prolonged period, and government agencies did little to instruct them otherwise.
The number ofAIDS cases reached a dramatic height (sixteen thousand) in January
1986,
33 and the infection was making inroads among intravenous drug users and prosti-
tutes in major cities. These latter groups not only were largely heterosexual, but also were
seen as bridges for the spread ofAIDS to the broad general public. Transfusion cases
were growing, and more than two-thirds of the estimated twenty thousand seriously af-
flicted hemophiliacs in the United States had acquired the infection through contaminated
blood products. 34 In early 1986, the National Academy of Sciences and the Institute of
Medicine decided to undertake a special assessment of the problems and to propose an
appropriate national response. Public pressure for action was mounting.
In February 1986, President Reagan called for a report on AIDS from the U.S. surgeon
general, Dr. C. Everett Koop. A spokesperson for the U.S. Public Health Service at that
time estimated that the report would be ready by May or June, but it was not issued until
two weeks before the NAS-IOM report; many felt the timing was deliberate to counteract
the complaint that the president had yet to comment or act directly on AIDS. 35 Koop's
thirty-six-page, plainspoken report about the medical facts and sexual aspects ofAIDS
drew heavy fire from the fundamentalist religious contingent and from ultraconservative
congressional and White House factions. His pamphlet remained, until October 1987, the
only major administration document on AIDS. It has yet to be distributed directly to
American households. An influential opponent of sexually specific AIDS education in the
schools and of Koop's report is the stolidly conservative U.S. secretary of education,
William Bennett. Further, Bennett's former associate Gary Bauer now heads the Domestic
Policy Council in the White House. In the aftermath of the Third International Conference
on AIDS in June 1987, Congress appropriated $20 million for a mailing of Koop's report
to every American household. Instead, a folder was prepared for Dr. Otis R. Bowen, U.S.
secretary of health and human services, by the CDC as part of its so-called America Re-
sponds to AIDS project. In his introduction, Bowen calls the response "inspiring." 36 With
only scant reference to condoms and none to homosexuality, the folder advocates the
sharing of family moral and religious values, monogamous relationships, and, for teenag-
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ers, saying no to illicit drugs and no to sex. This booklet was to substitute for Koop's
forthright report. Some 45 million copies are "targeted" for distribution by states, local
health departments, YMCAs, and selected corporations. Congress has officially re-
quested the General Accounting Office to investigate "the Administration's failure" to
carry out Congress's mandate to mail AIDS data to every household; 37 other countries,
including Great Britain, have done such mailings. The administration, meanwhile, had
indicated that it intends to use the $20 million for other purposes. A different pamphlet is
now being readied for household mailing this summer, Bowen says, and the U.S. Public
Health Service plans to comply with the congressional mandate. Rep. Gerry Studds CD-
Mass.) contends that "the White House blocked the widespread distribution of Koop's
report, even now, because it deemed the information within the report too explicit for the
general public. The Administration's abject failure to fulfill its public health responsibili-
ties now verges on criminal negligence." 38
While the squabbling over Koop's and Bowen 's reports continues — a reflection of the
AIDS policy struggle within the White House— cities and community organizations are
left to try to combat the spread of AIDS on a local level. Cities like New York, San Fran-
cisco, Los Angeles, and Miami have gone public with the AIDS message— on billboards,
buses, rapid transit ads, and through extensive use of news media. Some states, including
Massachusetts, are sending out their own household mailings and have prepared class-
room curricula on AIDS (the CDC is now preparing its version). But there's a lot of slip-
page between the teaching guides and their use. Communities control what is taught in
their schools, and many have denied the introduction of AIDS materials. Though a few
cautionary spot announcements have been prepared, federally and at the state level, the
broadcast media have largely been slow to use them. The CDC regularly issues medical
advisories on AIDS infection control, but these do not reach broad public audiences.
Yet, continuing surveys show that Americans are highly aware of AIDS. Radio and TV
news features and documentaries, and stepped up reporting and special AIDS sections in
newspapers and magazines, along with plays and movies, have been the purveyors of
AIDS information for the public. Among the difficulties in such an arrangement are the
information, language, and cultural impediments, and the hit-or-miss nature of the pub-
lic's reading and viewing habits. Further, the degree of public attention paid the topic of
AIDS, as is true of most subjects, waxes and wanes with little consistency.
In terms of public policy, the United States has failed so far to address the need for
massive, persuasive, public education aimed at prevention on any long-term basis. Not
only has the federal government failed to spell out in precise language the nature of the
disease, but it has not yet even recognized that it lacks a mechanism for speaking directly
to the public. In Europe, Mexico, Canada, and Australia, as in China and India and Soviet
bloc nations, the governments have direct avenues for public communication — through
socialized health services and socialized radio and television. Although they are helpful,
mailings to households, public health agencies or community organizations do not begin
to address the need to persuade people to change their behavior. This involves more than
an occasional booklet. What is needed in the United States is some new, direct line of
communication — from the federal or state government, or both, to the citizenry. To con-
tinually update information about AIDS, as it changes, requires a ready means of getting
the information out— quickly, thoroughly, accurately. This is the AIDS education public
policy issue that demands immediate attention.
Some still would have it that AIDS has struck like a freak storm, blowing across areas
of the world that lie powerless in its path. AIDS, indeed, may be a new whirlwind, but its
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impact is worsened by the pervasive social neglect that now leaves the United States in a
weakened position to cope with it. AIDS is extracting a heavy penalty for our failure to
overcome homophobia, drug addiction, and prostitution; to establish a credible system for
funding health costs and providing health care; to attract, train, and fund sufficient medi-
cal and research personnel and to keep pace with the need for advanced research laborato-
ries; to create an adequate network of home care, nursing home care, hospices, and health
communication; to surmount the barriers that place inner-city minorities at risk for every
successive medical-social hardship; and to accept the validity of public sex education.
That is the landscape onto which AIDS has moved, a setting ill-prepared for its assault.
Though lack of presidential leadership does not fall neatly into a category of public
policy, national mismanagement of the AIDS epidemic does. As early as 1984, Con-
gress's Office of Technology Assessment chided the handling of the AIDS outbreak. 39 As
recently as August 1987, the U.S. General Accounting Office, in a Briefing Report to
Sen. Lawton Chiles, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human
Services, Education and Related Agencies and of the Senate Budget Committee, pre-
sented the views of a broad range of American experts on AIDS. It expressed deep con-
cern about a general lack of federal leadership, citing a "patchwork" of federal and state
funding for AIDS prevention programs and cumbersome processes for awarding research
grants. It also concluded that "within the context of current health policy-making ... the
federal response to AIDS appears uncoordinated and insufficient." 40 Six years into an
epidemic of the proportion and severity of AIDS, this conclusion borders on an indictment
of the Reagan administration, which has held the reins of federal power since 1981: AIDS
played out "on their watch." The latest Reagan ploy has been the naming of an AIDS
Commission, originally predominated by AIDS amateurs, to report on the ramifications
of the epidemic. Although the commission leadership has been strengthened and is mak-
ing a diligent effort to assess the AIDS outbreak and the response to it, it is late in the day
to do so.
To all appearances, Congress is now taking AIDS out of the administration's hands.
Despite the gloomy predictions, it is still possible to marshal the great scientific might
and vast social resources of the nation. "To have an impact on what happens in the mid-
1990s," warns Dr. Stephen Joseph ofNew York City, "we will have to take action now." 4 '
The ultimate public policy question regarding AIDS is whether enough public will and
government support can be mustered to act in time. The leviathan of AIDS will not wait.
Perspective
Two rules of thumb are helpful for understanding the AIDS phenomenon.
The first has to do with the pace of infection. It holds that although it takes years for the
first 1 percent of a population to become infected, after that a doubling phenomenon sets
in — whether the doubling time is six months, a year, or more. Studies of a large cohort of
homosexual men show that it took several years for 1 percent of the group to become
AIDS-infected, as they were by 1978. It then took only one more year to double to 2 per-
cent, and another year to reach 4 percent. The percentage reached into the teen figures by
1980, the mid-20 percents by 1981 . By 1982, 47 percent (almost half) were infected. This
happened before there was much awareness of AIDS and little change in behavior to con-
tain its spread. Today the number infected in that group is around 78 percent.
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The other rule of thumb relates to how many persons infected with AIDS will convert to
illness, and how soon it will happen. At first it seemed that only some few would convert;
others would be spared. In the beginning, the conversion rate seemed to be 1 to 2 percent
a year, then 3 to 5 percent a year, then 5 to 10 percent. The conversion rate seemed to slow
down between the third and fifth years. Now, it appears that after the fifth year of infec-
tion, the number of those who convert to illness seems to speed up again. Of eighty-eight
California men who have been infected with the AIDS virus for seven years, 90 percent
have fallen ill. Rather than escaping the disease state of AIDS, it seems more likely to be a
matter of time. Incubation may extend far longer than ten years. These two indices of
AIDS — spread of infection and conversion to illness — are of vital importance. The first
suggests that if the spread of AIDS is not kept below a critical point, it will continue
largely because there will be so many AIDS-infected people available for sexual or blood-
related contact with the noninfecteds. In other words, as the pool of virus grows, so does
the likelihood of encountering it. The second index, of conversion, indicates that the ulti-
mate number of AIDS cases may be nearly all of those persons now infected. Cases today
are a snapshot of the spread ofAIDS two to seven years ago. Future cases will be a reflec-
tion of failure to act, now.
Details ofthe AIDS epidemic and the extent to which it was mismanaged on almost every
front are documented in a new book, And the Band Played On: Politics, People, and the
AIDS Epidemic, by Randy Shilts, a reporterfor the San Francisco Chronicle who has
been writing about AIDS since 1982. The book stands as an indictment ofthe interlocking
process whereby the early spread ofAIDS can be traced to thefractious divisiyeness
within the male homosexual community; an imperious lack ofinterest by major science
centers; the torpid response ofpublic health officials, voluntary blood banks, state and
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Glossary
Aseptic meningitis. Non-pus-producing inflammation of the lining of the spinal













A treatment for an infection or malignancy.
A virus that is very common and may result in a mononu-
cleosis-like illness in young adults and that can be transmit-
ted sexually. In persons with depressed immune function,
this virus can reactivate and cause invasive disease of the
eyes, lungs, bowels, and other vital organs.
Organic loss of intellectual function.
The ability of certain viruses to spread throughout an in-
fected individual's body, causing dysfunction of several
different organ systems.
Any degenerative brain disease.
The virus that causes mononucleosis. In individuals whose
immune systems are not functioning, this virus may reacti-
vate from a latent stage and cause fevers and invasion of
specific organs, and may contribute to the development of
lymphomas (lymph gland cancers).
A virus that can be chronic and latent and that most typi-
cally causes blisters around the mouth or genitals. It is
sexually transmitted.
The microscopic arrangement of cells characteristic of
specific organs and disease states.
The ability of an individual to respond to infectious agents,
or to cells that become malignant, in order to protect the
individual from developing severe infection or malignancy.
Caused inadvertently by a physician, as in an untoward
illness or medical problem.
Glossary continued on page 56
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